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COMMENTS ON "DECONCENTRATING THE INNER CITY
POOR," BY MICHAEL SCHILL
EDWIN S. MILLS

This is a superb paper. It provides an excellent critical survey of a
vast literature. It discusses a wide range of emotional and controversial
issues in objective fashion. Its conclusions are not comforting or dramatic, but that fact reflects the world as it is and is likely to be.
I have never been much impressed with the "mismatch" hypothesis.
Large numbers of jobs were created in many central cities in the 1980s.
For example, employment located in the City of Chicago rose much
faster than the number of workers resident in the City. Yet there were
almost as many unemployed and underemployed City residents at the
end of the 1980s as at the beginning. That could be because of mismatch,
but it could also be because many of the low income City residents are
simply not prepared, by family background, education or experience, to
qualify for new jobs created in the 1980s. There is not much evidence
that low paying jobs moved to the suburbs in the 1980s. To a large extent, they simply disappeared. Increasingly, the returns to human capital
increased as the 1980s proceeded. The mismatch between job requirements and qualifications of inner city residents may be as bad in the suburbs as in the central cities. After about 1985, the 1980s were about a full
employment period. In many metropolitan areas, employers were looking for qualified workers. In addition to under-qualified residents, another reason for the lack of jobs in low income neighborhoods was the
street crime in low income neighborhoods. Employers and employees
were frightened to be in such neighborhoods.
I believe that scholars are overly impressed by the social efficiency
claims made on behalf of the Tiebout hypothesis. As a positive theory, it
stands up well. I suspect strongly that any losses in the efficiency of local
governments from reductions in their Tiebout-like organization would be
more than made up by gains in the private sector. Not all suburban locations are equally good for residents and workplaces. U.S. suburbs are
excessively segregated: too many exclude businesses, even shopping centers; and the homogeneity resulting from land use controls encourages
excessive commutes to workplaces.
Dispersion of low income central city residents would have two advantages. First, it would permit low income residents to locate better rel-
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ative to job locations, reducing their commuting costs. Second, I believe
it would increase the willingness of both businesses and high income
white suburbanites to locate in central cities. Not only would there be
less concentration of low income and minority populations there, but
also the high income white population would become convinced that
there is no place to hide. These are all efficiency matters and are quite
aside from the equity issues.
The difficulty is precisely the legal issues so thoroughly discussed by
Schill. The autonomy of suburban jurisdictions is strongly established.
Have no doubt, suburbanites will resist attempts to interfere with this
autonomy, especially for the purpose of enabling more low income people to reside there. It would be absolutely crucial to lower barriers everywhere more or less at the same time, in order to prevent any communities
from feeling that they were being overrun with large numbers of low
income residents. The New Jersey story is instructive. The entire Mount
Laurel I story was the doing of the New Jersey State Supreme Court. The
legislature resisted the Court's pleas to legislate for a decade. Legislators
were frightened to touch the subject. Only when they became convinced
that the Court was going to carry out its mandate did the legislature act.
When they did act, it was as much to undercut the Court's mandate as
anything. The ultimate irony was the provision in the legislation allowing
a community to transfer up to half of its court-mandated quota of low
income people to another community by paying for better housing in the
community to which the quota was sold. The price is set by supply and
demand. Inevitably, the result is legally to keep many low income people
in central cities, even though under the Court mandate they would have
qualified for suburban housing. So much for the benefits of integrating
the suburbs.
My judgment, heavily influenced by Mount Laurel, is that suburbs
will fight politically, legally and perhaps physically to protect their
autonomy.
The obvious legal solution is sweeping legislation, possibly imposing
quotas on suburban communities, by sovereign state legislatures. It is politically inconceivable. State courts do not show many signs of wanting to
follow the New Jersey Court down the Mount Laurel path. They are
probably deterred by the beating imposed on the ears of the New Jersey
Court for ten years by the articulate public.
Economists sometimes suggest bribing suburbs to accept low income
1. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
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residents: a bounty for each additional low income resident over the
number in the 1990 census. Who is going to pay the taxes for such bounties? The low income central city residents? They simply cannot afford it.
The high income suburbanites? They are not so stupid as to fail to realize
that they are paying with one hand and receiving with the other. There is
no one else, except for non-metropolitan residents, who will certainly not
pay to solve a problem for which they have no sympathy.
I believe that the future will see some low income and minority residents raising themselves by their bootstraps, improving their incomes
through gradually better education and work histories. Many such people will be acceptable in many suburbs, as they have been increasingly
during the last quarter century. It is a slow, painful and imperfect process, but I see no other scenario on the horizon. It will certainly have the
advantage, whatever it is worth, that the people who make it from the
ghetto to the suburbs will know that they made it on their merits and not
because of government intervention.

